

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

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GRÜNENTHAL GMBH  
Petitioner,

v.

ANTECIP BIOVENTURES II LLC,  
Patent Owner.

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PGR2018-00092  
Patent 9,820,999 B2

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Before TONI R. SCHEINER, GRACE KARAFFA OBERMANN, and  
SHERIDAN K. SNEDDEN, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

SNEDDEN, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

JUDGMENT  
Final Written Decision  
Determining Some Challenged Claims Unpatentable  
*35 U.S.C. § 328(a)*

## I. INTRODUCTION

This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. *Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc.*, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2018).

For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29 of U.S. Patent No. 9,820,999 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’999 patent”) are unpatentable. We also determine that Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 5–8, 11, 13, 15, 19–22, 26, and 30 of the ’999 patent are unpatentable.

### A. Procedural Background

Petitioner filed a Petition requesting *inter partes* review of claims 1–30 (“the challenged claims”) of the ’999 patent. Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner did not file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, we instituted an *inter partes* review of claims 1–30 of the ’999 patent on each ground of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. *See infra* Section I.E.

Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 10; “PO Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 11; “Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a Sur-Reply (Paper 18; “Sur-Reply”).

The Petition is supported by the Declaration of Lawrence Poree, M.D., Ph.D. Ex. 1003. In its Reply, Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Philip Robinson, MBChB, PhD, FRACP (Ex. 1044).

Oral argument was conducted on November 21, 2019. A transcript is entered as Paper 23 (“Tr.”).

We address herein the arguments and evidence set forth in the Papers to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties.

*B. The '999 Patent (Ex. 1001)*

The '999 patent is titled “Neridronic Acid for Treating Complex Regional Pain Syndrome.” Ex. 1001, [54]. The specification of the '999 patent describes “[o]steoclast inhibitors, such as neridronic acid, in an acid or salt form” for treating or alleviating “pain or related conditions, such as complex regional pain syndrome” (“CRPS”). *Id.*, Abstract. Two bisphosphonates specifically discussed in the specification are zoledronic acid and neridronic acid. *See* Ex. 1001, Figs. 1–16, 2:64–4:3 (figures and descriptions of figures, all pertaining to a method that employs zoledronic acid); *see also id.* at 2:50–60, 4:8 (identifying both zoledronic acid and neridronic acid as useful for treating CRPS triggered by bone fracture).

The '999 patent specification discusses a method of administering bisphosphonates—and, in particular, zoledronic acid or neridronic acid—for treating “bone fractures or to enhance the healing of bone fractures” in “a human being that is treated for CRPS, suffered from a precipitating injury such as a bone fracture.” *Id.* at 8:27–37. The specification, moreover, states that “[a]n oral dosage form of bisphosphonate such as zoledronic acid may be used to treat, or provide relief of, any type of pain including, but not limited to,” for example, CRPS. *Id.* at 7:43–52. The specification identifies

“bisphosphonate” compounds generally, and neridronic acid in particular, as useful for mitigating “pain associated” with, for example, “vertebral crush fractures” in a human being. Ex. 1001, 7:66–8:19, 64–67, 15:25–37, 91:5–7 (Embodiment 282), 93:50–94:5–32 (Embodiments 314–318).

Example 3 relates to “[t]he effect of orally administered zoledronic acid” in a “rat tibia fracture model of” CRPS. *Id.* at 51:28–30. Example 3 reports that zoledronic acid mitigates pain associated with CRPS, where that condition is induced in “rats by fracturing the right distal tibias of the animals.” *Id.* at 51:30–31. Example 3 discusses pain assessment methods and pain reduction achieved in the rat tibia fracture model when zoledronic acid is selected as the bisphosphonate. *Id.* at 51:47–52:11. In addition, Example 3 explains that “[t]his animal model has been shown to replicate the inciting trauma” (for example, a bone “fracture”) that is “observed in human CRPS patients.” *Id.* at 51:33–38.

The ’999 patent includes no working example using neridronic acid as the bisphosphonate. The general disclosure provides dosing information pertaining to neridronic acid when that compound is selected for use in the claimed method. *See, e.g., id.* at 26:30–43.

### *C. Illustrative Claim*

Claim 1, the only independent challenged claim, is illustrative and reproduced below:

1. A method of treating pain associated with complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) comprising selecting *a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture* and administering neridronic acid or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof to the human being, wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain.

Ex. 1001, 106:25–30 (emphasis added).

The other challenged claims (namely, claims 2–30) depend directly or indirectly from claim 1 and specify additional limitations that pertain to the type of CRPS, the form of neridronic acid, the method of administration, the age of the treated human being, baseline pain intensity, and dosing regimens. *See id.* at 106:31–107:26.

#### *D. Asserted Prior Art*

The Petition identifies the following references as prior art in the grounds of unpatentability:

(1) M. Varena et al., *Treatment of complex regional pain syndrome type I with neridronate: a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study*, RHEUMATOLOGY 52:534–42 (NOV. 2012) (Ex. 1005, “Varena 2012”);

(2) M. Varena et al., *Predictors of responsiveness to bisphosphonate treatment in patients with complex regional pain syndrome type I: A retrospective chart analysis*, PAIN MED. 18:1131–38 (2017) (Ex. 1015, “Varena 2016”);

(3) Manara et al., *SAT0524 Predictors of a Clinical Response to Bisphosphonates Treatment in Patients with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome Type I*, ANNALS OF THE RHEUMATIC DISEASES, 73 (Suppl. 2) (2014) (Ex. 1037, “Manara”);

(4) S. Bruehl, “*How common is complex regional pain syndrome-Type I?*,” PAIN 129:1–2 (2007) (Ex. 1006, “Bruehl”);

(5) D. Gatti et al., *Neridronic acid for the treatment of bone metabolic diseases*, EXPERT OP. ON DRUG METABOLISM & TOXICOLOGY 5(10): 1305–11 (Sept. 2009) (Ex. 1007, “Gatti”);

(6) G. La Montagna et al., *Successful neridronate therapy in transient osteoporosis of the hip*, CLIN. RHEUMATOL. 24: 67–69 (Aug. 2004) (Ex. 1008, “La Montagna”);

(7) D. Manicourt et al., *Role of alendronate in therapy for posttraumatic complex regional pain syndrome type I of the lower extremity*, ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 50(11): 3690–97 (Nov. 2004) (Ex. 1009, “Manicourt”);

(8) M. Muratore et al., *Il neridronato nel trattamento dell’algodistrofia simpatica riflessa dell’anca: confronto in aperto con il clodronato*, PROGRESSI IN RHEUMATOLOGIA, ABSTRACT BOOK VII CONGRESSO NAZIONALE COLLEGIO DEI REUMATOLOGI OSPEDALIERI 5 (Suppl. 1): 89 (April 16-18, 2004) (certified English translation) (Ex. 1010, “Muratore”); and

(9) Schwarzer & Maier, *Complex regional pain syndrome*, in GUIDE TO PAIN MANAGEMENT IN LOW-RESOURCE SETTINGS 249–254 (Kopf & Patel eds. 2010) (Ex. 1020, “Schwarzer”).

*E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability*

We instituted review of claims 1–30 of the ’999 patent as follows.

Paper 7.

Claims	35 U.S.C. § <sup>1</sup>	Reference(s)/Basis
1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, 27–29	102(a)	Varena 2012
1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, 27–29	102(a)	Varena 2016
1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 24–25, 27–29	102(a)	Manara

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<sup>1</sup> The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Because the ’514 patent was filed before March 16, 2013 (the effective date of the relevant amendment), the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.

Claims	35 U.S.C. § <sup>1</sup>	Reference(s)/Basis
1–4, 9–20, 22–29	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016, Manara, Bruehl Gatti, La Montagna, and Muratore
5–8, 21	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016, Manara, and Manicourt
30	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016 Manara, Schwarzer, Bruehl, Gatti, La Montagna, and Muratore
1–30	112(a), Enablement	

*F. Related Proceedings*

Petitioner identifies four post grant reviews as related proceedings, none of which involves the '999 patent: *See* PGR2017-00008 (“PGR008”); PGR2017-00022 (“PGR022”); PGR2018-00001 (“PGR001”); PGR2018-00062 (“PGR0062”). Pet. 5. Petitioner avers that PGR008 and PGR062 involve patents that “are all part of the same patent family” as the '999 patent. Pet. 5. Petitioner further avers that PGR022 and PGR001 involve patents that “belong to a different patent family than the '999 patent, but share the same inventor and also cover methods of treating pain conditions with bisphosphonate drugs.” *Id.* at 6. Petitioner states, based on information and belief, that “the '999 patent is not currently involved in any other judicial or administrative matters that would affect, or be affected by, a decision in this proceeding.” *Id.* Patent Owner, similarly, identifies no other related matters. Paper 4, 2.

## II. ANALYSIS

### A. *Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art*

We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the invention. Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had “an M.D. or a Ph.D. in a pain-medicine-relevant discipline, such as clinical health psychology or neuroscience, and at least 3–5 years of experience in the treatment of CRPS or related chronic pain conditions, or in the study of CRPS or related types of chronic pain.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20).

Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner contends that the “claims are directed to methods of treating pain associated with CRPS using a medication, i.e. neridronic acid,” and as such, “a POSA would have an M.D. or a Ph.D. in a discipline related to the interaction of drugs with a human body, such as biology, pharmacology, etc., and experience in supervising, carrying out, or collaborating in animal or human testing, including off-label treatment of patients related to drug development in the pain area.” *Id.* at 2–3.

Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we agree with Patent Owner that the claims are limited to methods of treating pain associated with CRPS and agree that the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art should likewise include those persons having the relevant education and sufficient clinical expertise in treating patients with pain associated with CRPS. That said, we discern no material differences between the parties’ respective definitions that would

alter the outcome of our decision based on our acceptance of one over the other.

We further note that prior art may also demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. *See Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting *Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp.*, 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

### *B. Claim Construction*

For petitions filed before November 13, 2018, we interpret the claims of an unexpired patent that will not expire before issuance of a final written decision using the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018)<sup>2</sup>; *Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. *In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the

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<sup>2</sup> An amendment to this rule does not apply here, because the Petition was filed before November 13, 2018. *See* Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)).

controversy. *Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Petitioner proposes claim constructions for the claim terms set forth in the table below. Pet. 14–18.

Term	Claims	Petitioner's Proposed Construction
“A method of treating pain associated with complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) comprising selecting a human being having CRPS”	1–30	Requires that neridronic acid be administered to a human being having CRPS for the purpose of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing pain associated with CRPS, or for activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body in a human being with CRPS.
“triggered by bone fracture”	1–30	Synonymous with fracture as a “precipitating event” or “predisposing event,” <i>i.e.</i> , a bone fracture causes or contributes to the occurrence or onset of CRPS.
“wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain”	1–30	The treatment actually results in an observed and/or measured reduction in pain in a patient.

We have considered Petitioner's claim constructions and adopt Petitioner's undisputed construction for the terms “triggered by bone fracture” and “wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain.” Petitioner's construction of those terms aligns with the plain words of the claim, finds support in the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Poree, and is not contested by Patent Owner. Pet. 14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–41; *see* PO Resp. 3–4 (Patent Owner, nowhere opposing that construction).

Patent Owner disputes Petitioner's construction for “[a] method of treating pain associated with complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS)

comprising selecting a human being having CRPS” in claim 1 of the ’999 patent. PO Resp. 3–4. Patent Owner first notes that the term “comprising” transitions from the preamble “[a] method of treating pain associated with complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS)” to the body of the claim, which begins with the verb “selecting.” Next, Patent Owner contends that the first element in the body of the claims is “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by a bone fracture,” and that Petitioner’s proposed construction reads the term “selecting” out of the claim. *Id.*

We agree with Patent Owner the term “selecting” appears in the body of the claim and that “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture” is a required element of the claims. To the extent further discussion of the meaning of this term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.

We determine that no express construction of any other claim term is necessary to determine whether Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims are unpatentable in this case.

### *C. Effective Filing Date of the ’999 Patent*

We next resolve the effective filing date of the ’999 patent. When discussing the prior art status of Varena 2012, Petitioner indicates that the effective filing date of the ’999 patent is “May 14, 2013—the filing date of U.S. Patent Application No. 13/894,274” (“the ’274 application”). Pet. 32; *see* Ex. 1001, [63] (identifying the ’274 application as a priority document). Elsewhere in the Petition, however, Petitioner repeatedly asserts that the earliest possible effective filing date is December 7, 2016—that is, the filing date of Provisional Application No. 62/431,287 (“the ’287 application”),

which is the third-filed of three provisional applications identified on the face of the '999 patent. Pet. 9, 11–12, 16, 20, 24 n.1, 45–46; *see* Ex. 1001, [60] (claiming priority through three provisional applications, including the '287 application). For reasons explained below, we find that the effective filing date of the '999 patent is May 14, 2013, the filing date of the '274 application. *See* Ex. 1001, [63] (identifying chain of priority from May 14, 2013, the filing date of the '274 application).

Petitioner acknowledges that the '999 patent claims the benefit of priority not only from the filing date of the '274 application, but also from the filing date of Provisional Application No. 61/646,538 (“the '538 application”), which is the first-filed provisional application identified on the face of the '999 patent. Pet. 32; *see* Ex. 1001, [60] (identifying the '538 application, filed May 14, 2012); *see id.* at [63] (claiming priority also through the '247 application, filed May 14, 2013). The '538 application was filed on May 14, 2012. Petitioner argues that the disclosure of the '538 application, however, does not support the challenged claims because that application nowhere refers to the claim 1 limitation that requires “bone fracture as a triggering event for CRPS.” *Id.*<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere in the Petition, Petitioner asserts that the '999 patent claims are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the second-filed Provisional Application No. 62/378,140 (“the '140 application”), which was filed on August 22, 2016. Pet. 29. We agree with Petitioner that the '140 application “does not even mention neridronic acid at all.” *Id.*; *see generally* Ex. 1029, 9–35 (the '140 application). We disagree with Petitioner’s further contention, however, that the '140 application does not support the limitation that requires bone fracture as a triggering event for CRPS. Pet. 46. In that regard, the '140 application discloses “[t]he therapeutic efficacy of bisphosphonate treatment in the rat CRPS fracture model”—

We find that Petitioner shows sufficiently that the disclosure of the '538 application does not support the claims of the '999 patent. *See* Pet. 20–24 (and evidence cited therein). Petitioner's information on that point is not challenged. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the '538 application nowhere mentions any triggering events for CRPS and, further, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would not have understood that administering neridronic acid to treat CRPS specifically triggered by bone fracture was an aspect of the alleged invention.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 45 (Dr. Poree's assertion that “[t]he terms ‘bone,’ ‘fracture,’ and ‘triggered’ do not appear anywhere in the ['538] application”), ¶ 46 (Dr. Poree's further assertion that “[n]othing in the '538 application suggests that the patentee was in possession of a method of treating pain associated with CRPS triggered by bone fracture” or “that this was even an aspect of the alleged invention”); *see* Ex. 1016, 4–6 (disclosure from the '538 application, nowhere mentioning bone fracture as a triggering event for CRPS).

Petitioner does not show adequately, however, that the '999 patent is not entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of the '274 application, which was filed on May 14, 2013. Ex. 1001, [63] (the '999 patent, identifying the '274 application as a priority document); *see, e.g.*, Pet. 9, 11–12, 16, 20, 24 n.1, 45–46 (Petitioner, asserting that the earliest possible effective priority date is December 7, 2016, but failing to account adequately for the claim of priority that derives from the filing date of the '274 application). On that point, Petitioner argues only that the '274 application

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including data pertaining to a rat tibia fracture study, which demonstrates “that bisphosphonate therapy inhibits pain . . . in the rat fracture model of CRPS.” Ex. 1029, 9, 23.

contains no “additional information about how to treat CRPS with neridronate other than the limited information in the ’999 patent specification.” Pet. 29. Significantly, however, the ’274 application identifies “neridronate or neridronic acid” as “another bisphosphonate” that “may be useful to treat complex regional pain syndrome” and “acute vertebral crush fracture.” Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 23, 37, claim 79. The ’274 application expressly defines “[t]he term ‘treating’ or ‘treatment’” to “broadly include any kind of treatment activity, including . . . mitigation of disease in man . . . or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man.” *Id.* ¶ 24. The ’274 application also discloses data, in Example 3, which specifically addresses the efficacy of administering a bisphosphonate compound, and reports the results of a rat tibia fracture model study, which includes pain assessments performed on rats having CRPS triggered by bone fractures. *Id.* ¶¶ 97–101.

On this record, we reject Petitioner’s contention that the ’274 application fails to support the limitation of claim 1 that requires the effective treatment of pain associated with CRPS triggered by bone fracture. Pet. 32. Accordingly, we assign the ’999 patent an effective filing date of May 14, 2013—the date of filing of the ’274 application. Ex. 1001, [63].

*D. Varena 2012 is a Prior Art Printed Publication*

*Inter partes* review may be requested only “on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. 311(b). There is no presumption in favor of finding that a reference is a printed publication.

*Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC*, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 12–14 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). To qualify as a “printed

publication” within the meaning of § 102, a reference “must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. *In re Cronyn*, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Whether a reference is publicly accessible is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the “facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” *In re Lister*, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A reference is considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it. *Id.*; *see also Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc.*, 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“A reference is considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’”).

In the present case, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner cites to no evidence to support its contention that Varenna 2012 was publically accessible before the effective filing date of the invention and therefore prior art to the ’999 patent. PO Resp. 4–13. Patent Owner contends that the only evidence entered in support of the Petition is Ex. 1005, “a .pdf file downloaded from the Internet on December 6, 2017.” PO Resp. 4–5; Ex. 1005. Patent Owner contends that “[s]omething downloaded from the Internet on December 6, 2017, is obviously not prior art to something having a priority date of May 14, 2013, such as the ’999 patent.” *Id.* at 5; Sur-Reply 6–7. Patent Owner further contends that a copyright notice standing alone does not constitute evidence demonstrating that Varenna 2012 was in

fact publicly accessible before the priority date of May 14, 2013. PO Resp. 5–6; Sur-Reply 12–13.

In its Reply, Petitioner contends that it has provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that Varena 2012 is prior art printed publication to the '999 patent. Reply 5–11. Specifically, Petitioner argues that

Varena 2012 was plainly published, i.e. made publicly available, before [earliest possible priority date of May 14, 2013]. At the top of the first page, Varena 2012 expressly states that it is an article from the journal *Rheumatology* published on November 30, 2012. Ex. 1005 at 534. Moreover, the copyright line at the bottom of the first page reads: “© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.” *Id.* This indicates that Varena 2012 was published in 2012 by a well-known and reputable publisher.

*Id.* at 5. In its Reply, Petitioner additionally relies on the Declaration of Dr. Philip Robinson, who testifies that he accessed, reviewed, and posted about Varena 2012 on the social media site Twitter in February 2013, which is before the May 14, 2013 priority date of the '999 patent. Ex. 1044; Reply 11.

We have considered the parties positions, summarized above, and find Petitioner to have the better position. In reaching our determination, we weigh the totality of the evidence currently in the record to resolve the dispute between the parties of whether Varena 2012 is a prior art printed publication. On one hand, we weigh the evidence supporting Petitioner's position that Varena 2012 was published and made available to the interested scientific community via the journal *Rheumatology* prior to the priority date of the '999 patent, summarized above. Reply 7–11; Ex. 1005 (indicia on the face of the document); Ex. 1044. To that point, we are

persuaded that the information pertaining to the publication of Varenna 2012 on the face of the document is sufficient to establish Varenna 2012 as a printed publication. *See, e.g., Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. TCL Corp.*, 941 F.3d 1341, 1344 & 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that “the date on the face of the journal” was part of the substantial evidence supporting PTAB’s finding that a journal article was prior art); *Hulu*, at 17–20 (“[T]he indicia on the face of a reference, such as printed dates and stamps, are considered as part of the totality of the evidence.”).

In particular, Varenna 2012 bears several hallmarks suggesting it was published in 2012 as part of a regularly distributed medical journal. These hallmarks include the name of the journal (“Rheumatology”); citation information reflecting the date, the volume number, and the pertinent page numbers of the journal (“2013; 52:534–542”); the dates the article was available to the public (“Advance Access publication 30 November 2012”); a link to the website of the journal (“[www.rheumatology.oxfordjournals.org](http://www.rheumatology.oxfordjournals.org)”); the publisher of the journal (“© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology”); and where readers interested in learning more about the topic of Varenna 2012 can make inquiries (“Correspondence to: Silvano Adami, Rheumatology Unit, Policlinico GB Rossi, Piazzale Scuro, 37121 Verona, Italy”).

On the other hand, we consider the lack of evidence supporting Patent Owner’s position that Varenna 2012 is not a printed publication. In this regard, we note that Patent Owner provides no evidence to counter the indicia on the face of Varenna 2012 or the testimony of Dr. Philip Robinson. PO Resp. 4–13; Sur-Reply 5–13. Indeed, Patent Owner does not even

contest that Oxford University Press is a known publisher or that Rheumatology is an established journal. Tr. 30:13–21. Rather, Patent Owner’s position is that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of establishing Varena 2012 as a prior art printed publication—that is, the indicia of publication on the face of the document are insufficient to establish the Varena 2012 as a prior art printed publication. PO Resp. 8–10.

We also consider Patent Owner’s attorney argument in response to the declaration evidence of Dr. Robinson, that

This testimony does not show accessibility by interested POSAs. The declarant does not say, for example, whether he “accessed [and] reviewed” Varena 2012 after a reasonably diligent search, or whether someone simply directed him to it. Nor does the declarant provide any information that would allow a conclusion that his mere possession of Varena 2012 can be extrapolated to legally significant accessibility by interested POSAs at large. The declarant likewise says nothing about his Twitter following, that is, about whether some or all of his followers qualify as POSAs. Further diluting things, the declarant also attaches two versions of Varena 2012 he purports are the same as they were on February 3, 2013, but that testimony defies belief. It would require a photographic and infallible memory of things seen and read over six years ago. At best it shows merely that the two articles may or may not be similar or identical to something the declarant saw or thinks he saw six years ago. Hyperlinks on the Internet are not static, so retrieving an article from a URL today does nothing to prove that article was there yesterday, or what it looked like yesterday. This evidence fails to establish the public accessibility of Varena 2012 to the level the law requires.

Sur-Reply 23. It is well established that such bare attorney arguments cannot take the place of objective evidence and, thus, we accord them little evidentiary weight. *In re Payne*, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (CCPA 1979); *In re Pearson*, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a

brief cannot take the place of evidence”). That bare attorney argument does not outweigh the objective proof advanced by Dr. Robinson showing that he accessed, reviewed, and posted about Varena 2012 on the social media site Twitter in February 2013, which is before the May 14, 2013 priority date of the ’999 patent. *See* Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 5–7 (directing us to Exhibits A, B, and C, which tend to establish the veracity of Dr. Robinson’s testimony on point).<sup>4</sup>

Having considered the parties positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine the totality of the evidence—the indicia of publication on the face of the document and testimony of Dr. Robinson—supports a finding that Varena 2012 was publicly available as of November 30, 2012, the “Advance Access” publication date on the face of the journal. We further credit the testimony of Dr. Robinson and are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s bare attorney argument to the contrary. Attorney argument cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record. *In re Pearson*, 494 F.2d at 1405.

In view of the above, we determine that Varena 2012 qualifies as a prior art printed publication to the ’999 patent.

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<sup>4</sup> Patent Owner moved to strike Dr. Robinson’s Declaration and related portions of Petitioner’s Reply, which we denied. Papers 11 and 24. Even if we set aside Dr. Robinson’s Declaration, however, we are persuaded that the indicia of publication on the face of Varena 2012 are sufficient to establish that Varena 2012 was “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” and “disseminated or otherwise made available” to the interested public before the critical date, and consequently, a printed publication. *Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

*E. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability*

In this section, we address in turn the following grounds of unpatentability advanced in the Petition: (1) anticipation; (2) obviousness; and (3) lack of enablement. Pet. 8–9.

*1. The Grounds Based on Anticipation*

Petitioner asserts three anticipation grounds against claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29 based on, respectively, the disclosures of Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016, and Manara. Pet. 8. We address the three anticipation grounds in turn below.

*a. Anticipation by Varenna 2012*

Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29 are anticipated by Varenna 2012. Pet. 31–44. We first address independent claim 1, then turn to the dependent challenged claims.

*(i) Claim 1*

The parties do not dispute that Varenna 2012 discloses administration of neridronic acid to human beings having CRPS as recited in claim 1. Pet. 33–34; Ex. 1003 ¶ 87; PO Resp. 14–20. The dispute between the parties is whether Varenna 2012 expressly or inherently discloses the recited elements of 1) “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture” and 2) “wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain” in patients with CRPS triggered by bone fracture. PO Resp. 14; Pet. 31–37 (information directed to anticipation of claim 1 by Varenna 2012); Ex. 1001, 106:25–30 (claim 1). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Varenna 2012 discloses each of the disputed elements of claim 1 and that Varenna 2012 anticipates claim 1.

(a) “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture”

With regard to the element of “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture,” Petitioner contends that “this limitation should be construed as requiring the human being treated to have CRPS wherein a bone fracture caused or contributed to the occurrence or onset of CRPS, and is synonymous with bone fracture as a precipitating or predisposing event.”

Pet. 34. On this point, Petitioner contends that Varena 2012

discloses that 11 of the 41 patients enrolled in the neridronate arm of the study (26.8%) had fracture as a precipitating event for CRPS. Ex. 1005 at 536, Table 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. Of the 41 patients enrolled in the placebo arm, 17 had fracture as a precipitating event for CRPS (41.4%). Ex. 1005 at 536, Table 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. After the double-blind phase of the study concluded, the patients that had been on placebo were given neridronate following the same regimen (four 100-mg infusions over 10 days) as in the double-blind phase. Ex. 1005 at 535; Ex. 1003 ¶ 90.

Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1005, 534, 535; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87–90).

Petitioner further relies on Dr. Poree’s declaration, wherein Dr. Poree specifically opines that the limitation “comprising selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture” is disclosed in Varena 2012.

Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–90. Dr. Poree explains that “[t]his limitation requires the human being treated to have CRPS wherein a bone fracture caused or contributed to the occurrence or onset of CRPS, and has the same meaning as bone fracture as a precipitating or predisposing event for CRPS.” *Id.* at ¶ 86. Thus, according to Petitioner, “Varena 2012 discloses selecting and treating a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture as required by claim 1.” *Id.* at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87).

Patent Owner contends that Varena 2012 does not expressly disclose the claim requirement for “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture.” *Id.* at 14. In short, Patent Owner argues that the study reported by Varena 2012 did not select patients on the basis of having CRPS triggered by bone fracture, the study only happened to include such patients. PO Resp. 14–20; Sur-Reply 14–17. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that

Varena 2012 does not disclose deliberately selecting humans suffering from CRPS because their CRPS was caused by bone fracture. “Selecting” requires deliberation. It is not enough to simply apply the claimed method to people who happen to have CRPS that happens to have been caused by bone fracture; the selection must have been deliberately made based on those criteria. Varena 2012 does not disclose “selecting” in this way. Sur-Reply 14 (emphasis omitted).

To support its position, Patent Owner directs our attention to the section of Varena 2012 that provides detail on the methods and criteria used to select patients for the study. *Id.* at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005, 535). With reference to that section of Varena 2012, Patent Owner contends that Varena 2012 used at least 15 criteria to select patients for the study, however, “CRPS triggered by bone fracture” is not among the criteria used. *Id.* at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005, 535). Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Varena 2012

contains at least 15 examples of “to choose from a number or group: pick out.” These are at least: 1) patients fulfilled the Budapest criteria, 2) patients had involvement of hands or feet, 3) patients had an age of at least 18 years, 4) patients had disease duration no longer than 4 months, 5) patients had a VAS of at least 50 mm, 6) patients had abnormal uptake of the bone seeking agent in three-phase bone scintigraphy in both early and late phases, 6)[*sic*] female patients of childbearing age had a negative

pregnancy test, 7) patients had no hepatic disease, 8) patients had no renal disease, 9) patients had no endocrine disease, 10) patients had no haematological disease, 11) patients had no cardiac disease, 12) patients had no pulmonary disease, 13) patients had no neurological disease, 14) patients had no routine laboratory abnormalities, and 15) patients had no prior treatment with bisphosphonates. Thus, Varena 2012 did a great deal of selecting, but none that had to do with “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture.”

*Id.* at 15 (emphasis omitted).

Patent Owner contends that Dr. Poree’s declaration does not provide factual support for Petitioner’s assertion that Varena 2012 discloses selecting patients on the basis of having CRPS triggered by fracture. *Id.* at 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87). In particular, Patent Owner contends that Dr. Poree makes no express statement supporting Petitioner’s notion that Varena 2012 discloses selecting patients having CRPS triggered by fracture. *Id.* Thus, according to Patent Owner, Petitioner has “offered absolutely no evidence that Varena 2012 discloses selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture, either expressly or inherently.” *Id.*; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–90.

Patent Owner further contends that

[t]he only place where *Varena 2012* even mentions bone fracture is in Table 1, and *Varena 2012* makes it clear that patients were not selected for fracture as a precipitating event because assignment to neridronic acid treatment was random. *Varena 2012* states that “[a] centrally computer-generated table of random numbers was used for the treatment assignment. Patients were treated with either neridronate . . . or placebo with an identical appearance in a 1:1 ratio . . . Neither patients nor investigators knew whether the assignment would be the placebo or the neridronate group.” (Ex. 1005 at 535 (emphasis added).) Therefore, the element “selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture” is not expressly or inherently found

in *Varena 2012*, and claims 1–30 are not anticipated by the reference.

PO Resp. 14–15.

Thus, according to Patent Owner, *Varena 2012* does not in fact disclose deliberate “selecting” based on CRPS having been caused by bone fracture. PO Resp. 14–20; Sur-Reply 14–17. “Rather, the Petition simply addresses the clause as if the word ‘selecting’ has no effect at all upon its meaning.” Sur-Reply 16 (citing Pet. 34–35).

Having considered the parties positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that *Varena 2012* inherently discloses the required element of selecting a human being having CRPS triggered by bone fracture. *Varena* discloses that a subset of the patients included in the human clinical study experienced bone “fracture” as a “[p]recipitating event” for CRPS. Ex. 1005, 536 (Table 1). Additionally, *Varena 2012* shows that the data collected was analyzed on the basis of precipitating event—that is, predisposing factor was among the variables analyzed. Ex. 1005, 536. Those precipitating events include fracture, trauma, and surgery. *Id.* at 536 (Table 1). While *Varena 2012* does not expressly disclose that those patients were selected because they have CRPS triggered by bone fracture, the study was designed to assess predisposing factors as a distinct variable in order “to assess the potential influence of baseline variables on treatment effect.” *Id.* at 536 (“Multivariate regression analysis was performed to assess the potential influence of baseline variables on treatment effect [site of disease: (upper/lower limb), disease duration and precipitating event (none/trauma, surgery)].”).

Additionally, Dr. Poree testifies that Varena 2012 shows that patients having fracture-induced CRPS were selected for inclusion in the neridronate treatment study. Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. More specifically, he testifies that 11 of the 41 patients included in the neridronate arm and 17 of 41 patients included in the placebo arm had fracture-induced CRPS. *Id.* at ¶¶ 88–90. We see no meaningful distinction between including a patient in a study, which involves treating that patient with neridronate, and selecting a patient for treatment with neridronate. Thus, in our view, the 11 patients included in the neridronate arm of the study were, in essence, selected for treatment with neridronate. Further, as Dr. Poree testifies, all of the patients in the placebo arm, including the 17 fracture-induced CRPS patients, who had initially been given placebo were then put into the open-extension phase of the study, in which they were given neridronate using the same regimen given to those patients initially in the treatment group. *Id.* at ¶ 90. In other words, those 17 fracture-induced CRPS patients were included in the open-extension phase of the study (and, thereby, were selected for treatment with neridronate).

When we consider Dr. Poree’s testimony with the results disclosed by Varena 2012, we are persuaded that the totality of the evidence shows that Varena 2012 discloses that CPRS triggered by bone fracture was among the criteria used to select patients and to determine treatment outcomes. That is, selecting a patient having CRPS triggered by bone fracture is inherent to the study design as evidenced by the presentation of the results and statistical analysis based on predisposing factors in Varena 2012.

(b) “wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain”

With regard to the element of “wherein the treatment is effective in reducing pain,” we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Varena 2012 does not disclose that neridronic acid is effective in reducing pain in human patients having CRPS triggered by bone. PO Resp. 15–16; Sur-Reply 17–22. Rather, we are persuaded that Petitioner advances information that sufficiently supports that factual contention. Pet. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1005, 534–538, Table 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–100). In particular, we note that Varena 2012 reports “the efficacy of the amino-bisphosphonate neridronate in patients with” CRPS, including “clinically relevant and persistent benefits” associated with the administration of neridronate. *Id.* at 33 (citing Ex. 1005 at 534; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84). Significantly, Varena expressly teaches that neridronate effectively mitigates pain associated with CRPS in patients presenting with “bone fracture” as “a predisposing event for” that condition. Ex. 1001, 84:61–62; *see* Pet. 34–35 (citing, for example, Ex. 1005, 535–36, 538–39, Table 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87–90). Of particular significance is Varena’s identification of a subset of patients in a human clinical study that experienced bone “fracture” as a “[p]recipitating event” for CRPS. Ex. 1005, 536 (Table 1). Varena reports that, in that subset of patients, the administration of neridronate effectively mitigated pain. Pet. 32–33, 37–39 (and evidence cited therein); Ex. 1005, 534, 536; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–100.

Further to that point, we agree with Petitioner that Varena 2012 discloses that “the particular type of precipitating event did not influence outcomes in the study, indicating that patients with all types of precipitating events, including fractures, benefited from the neridronate treatment.”

Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 234); *see* Ex. 1005, 538 (Varena 2012, explaining, “[i]n multivariate regression analysis,” no “baseline variables except treatment assignment” “appeared to influence outcome measures”). Here, we credit Dr. Poree’s testimony on that point. Specifically, Dr. Poree states in his declaration that:

A “[m]ultivariate regression analysis was performed to assess the potential influence of baseline variables on treatment effect [site of disease: (upper/lower limb), disease duration and precipitating event (none/trauma, surgery)].” Exhibit 1005, Varena 2012 at 536. In the multivariate regression analysis, *baseline variables other than treatment assignment did not appear to influence outcome measures.*

Ex. 1003 ¶ 99 (emphasis added).

Several other facts confirm our above analysis. Varena informs, “[i]n patients with acute CRPS-I,” the intravenous administration of neridronate is “associated with clinically relevant and persistent benefits.” Ex. 1005, 534; *see* Pet. 36–39 (and evidence cited therein). Varena reports results that provide “conclusive evidence that the use of bisphosphonates . . . is the treatment of choice for CRPS-I.” Ex. 1005, 534. “CRPS was known in the prior art as a severely debilitating pain syndrome that sometimes develops after trauma such as a bone fracture.” Pet. 1. Varena discloses with anticipatory specificity the mitigation of pain in patients suffering from CRPS (including those in which that pain syndrome was triggered by bone fracture) by treatment with neridronate. Pet. 33–34, 36–37; Ex. 1005, 534, 536; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–100.

Accordingly, we determine, on this record, Petitioner shows sufficiently that pain was mitigated effectively in those patients by

administration of neridronate. Pet. 33–34, 36–37 (and evidence cited therein).

(ii) *Dependent Claims*

Varenna 2012 also anticipates the subject matter of dependent claims 2–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29, each of which depends directly or indirectly from claim 1. *See* Pet. 39–46 (including substantial evidence cited therein). Patent Owner raises no new argument directed to any of those independent claims. PO Resp. 14–20; Sur-Reply 14–22. Instead, Patent Owner relies on argument presented in the context of claim 1. *Id.* Our analysis pertaining to claim 1 applies with equal force to dependent claims 2–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23, 24, and 27–29.

*b. Anticipation by Varenna 2016*

Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29 are anticipated by Varenna 2016. For reasons explained above, on this record, we find that the effective filing date of the '999 patent is May 14, 2013. Petitioner asserts that, “[a]lthough the issue of the journal” in which the reference appears “is dated June 2017, Varenna 2016 was first published on September 20, 2016.” Pet. 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 133). Even if we accept that contention, Varenna 2016 does not qualify as prior art against the '999 patent claims, because the reference was published after the effective filing date of the patent. Accordingly, on this record, we find that Petitioner has not shown that any challenged claim is more likely than not anticipated by Varenna 2016.

*c. Anticipation by Manara*

Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 24–25, and 27–29 are anticipated by Manara. For reasons explained above, on this record, we find that the effective filing date of the '999 patent is May 14, 2013. Petitioner asserts that Manara was first published in June of 2014. Pet. 55–56. Even if we accept that contention, Manara does not qualify as prior art against the '999 patent claims, because the reference was published after the effective filing date of the patent. Accordingly, on this record, we find that Petitioner has not shown that any challenged claim is more likely than not anticipated by Manara.

*2. The Grounds Based on Obviousness*

Petitioner asserts three obviousness grounds of unpatentability, but each ground depends on the contention that Varenna 2016 and Manara constitute prior art. Pet. 8, 62–79 (and evidence cited therein). For reasons explained above, we find that Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that those references are prior art against the '999 patent claims. *See supra*. Accordingly, we find also that Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely than not that any challenged claim is unpatentable based on the obviousness grounds stated in the Petition. *See* Pet. 62–79 (obviousness grounds).

*3. The Ground Based on Lack of Enablement*

We next address Petitioner's assertion that the '999 patent specification fails to enable the claimed invention. Pet. 25–30. We evaluate enablement by considering whether the patent disclosure, at the time of

filing,<sup>5</sup> would have enabled a person of ordinary skill in art to make and use the subject matter of the claims. *In re Wands*, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The touchstone of enablement is whether undue experimentation would have been required to practice the claimed invention. *Id.*

At the outset, we note that Petitioner has established that Varena 2012 anticipates many of the challenged claims, including independent claim 1. *See supra*. That circumstance appears inconsistent with Petitioner’s further view that the degree of detail and guidance provided in the specification is inadequate in view of the state of the prior art as revealed by the disclosure of Varena 2012. Pet. 26–29. Significantly, on that point, Petitioner admits that “methods of treating pain associated with CRPS with neridronic acid—including pain associated with CRPS triggered by fracture—were known in the prior art.” *Id.* at 30.

Having considered Varena 2012 and Petitioner’s arguments and evidence related to Varena 2012, we find that the disclosure of Varena 2012 would have informed an ordinary artisan, well before the critical date, exactly how to administer neridronic acid to humans having CRPS triggered by bone fracture with an expectation of mitigating pain associated with that condition. Ex. 1005, 534 (Abstract), 535 (study design), 536 (Table 1 and results and efficacy data), 538 (Table 2 and discussion of improvement in pain symptoms upon treatment with neridronate). That finding is fully consistent with views formed by the Examiner during patent prosecution.

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<sup>5</sup> We follow Petitioner’s convention of referring to the ’999 patent specification, rather than any priority application, when discussing the ground based on lack of enablement. Pet. 26–28.

Ex. 1022, 454 (“[T]he dosage forms and the herein claimed routes of administration and the dosing regimens are all well-known according to the teachings of the cited prior art. The dosage of neridronic acid taught in the prior art encompasses the herein claimed dosage.”). On that point, we observe that Varena 2012—which is cited on the face of the ’999 patent (Ex. 1001 (56))—was among the prior art references before the Examiner.

The information advanced in the Petition does not account adequately for the fact that Varena 2012 establishes a level of ordinary skill in the art that makes reasonable the degree of detail set forth in the specification. Pet. 26–29. “The specification need not disclose what is well known in the art.” *In re Buchner*, 929 F.2d 660, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1991). On this record, the Petition does not advance information from which we reasonably can find that any experimentation, much less undue experimentation, would have been necessary to enable the claimed invention. Pet. 26–29. Here, we take account of both the disclosures set forth within the specification and the general knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan as demonstrated by Varena 2012. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1001, 2:59–60, 4:7–13, 7:38–8:38, 26:30–43, 33:26–57, 42:7–46:59, 51:24–52:61, 71:38–42, 72:12–15 (patent disclosures); Ex. 1005 (Varena 2012). The state of the prior art informs our decision that the specification includes details and guidance that, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, sufficiently enable the claims.

An enabling disclosure need not disclose any working examples or demonstrate that the claimed invention was actually reduced to practice at the time of filing. *Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs, Inc.*, 745 F.3d 1180, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Where there is no need for an actual reduction to practice, we are not persuaded that the failure to include a working example,

specific to neridronic acid, supports a conclusion that undue experimentation would have been necessary to make and use the claimed invention. *See* Pet. 28–29 (arguing that the failure to include a working example directed to neridronic acid, in particular, supports a finding of lack of enablement).

In reaching our conclusions on the ground based on enablement, we take notice that “a considerable amount of routine experimentation” is permitted without rising to the level of undue experimentation under a correct enablement analysis. *PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp.*, 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Petitioner does not address, much less explain adequately, how or why any required experimentation would have risen above the routine, given the state of the art as exemplified by the disclosure of Varena 2012. Pet. 26–30.

In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any challenged claim is unpatentable for lack of an enabling disclosure.

### III. CONCLUSION

In summary, we make the following conclusions.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Should Patent Owner wish to pursue amendment of the challenged claims in a reissue or reexamination proceeding subsequent to the issuance of this decision, we draw Patent Owner’s attention to the April 2019 *Notice Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding*. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. 16,654 (Apr. 22, 2019). If Patent Owner chooses to file a reissue application or a request for reexamination of the challenged patent, we remind Patent Owner of its continuing obligation to notify the Board of any such related matters in updated mandatory notices. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3), (b)(2)

<b>Claims</b>	<b>35 U.S.C. §</b>	<b>Reference(s)/ Basis</b>	<b>Claims Shown Unpatentable</b>	<b>Claims Not Shown Unpatentable</b>
1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16- 18, 23-25, 27-29	102(a)	Varenna 2012	1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, 27-29	
1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16- 18, 23-25, 27-29	102(a)	Varenna 2016		1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, 27-29
1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16- 18, 24-25, 27-29	102(a)	Manara		1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 24-25, 27-29
1-4, 9-20, 22-29	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016, Manara, Bruehl Gatti, La Montagna, and Muratore		1-4, 9-20, 22-29
5-8, 21	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016, Manara, and Manicourt		5-8, 21
30	103(a)	Varenna 2012, Varenna 2016 Manara, Schwarzer, Bruehl, Gatti, La Montagna, and Muratore		30
1-30	112(a)			1-30
<b>Overall Outcome</b>			1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, 27-29	5-8, 11, 13, 15, 19-22, 26, 30

#### IV. ORDER

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that claims 1–4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 23–25, and 27–29 of the '999 patent are unpatentable;

FURTHER ORDERED that claims 5–8, 11, 13, 15, 19–22, 26, and 30 of the '999 patent are not shown to be unpatentable; and

FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a Final Written Decision, parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.

PGR2018-00092  
Patent 9,820,999 B2

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